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preme over its competitors, but only a choice of methods chang-
ing with the changing problem .... I
I. Introduction
The Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon2 case ("Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon") can be seen as a landmark case, not so much for
what it said, but for what it represents. The issue of what it
represents has much to do with the stature of Justice Benjamin
N. Cardozo and the year of the case-1917. Cardozo placed an
epitaph on what has been dubbed the age of formalism, 3 or the
era of classical legal thought. 4 The new era sought to advance
the notion of judicial reasoning as being one focused on the bal-
ancing of interests, public policy rationales and the context-de-
pendent nature of meaning.5 It is the last of these items that
will be the primary subject of this essay.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1927), in SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOOzo 232-33 (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947).
2. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
3. Professor Pratt states that the "critical origins of the transformation of con-
tract doctrine lie in the period between 1870 and 1920." Walter Pratt, American
Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 416 (1988). Karl
Llewellyn distinguishes between "Formal Style" and "Grand Style" legal reason-
ing. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5-6,
35-45 (1960). Ian Macneil describes the era of "classical contract law [as] that de-
veloped in the 19th century and brought to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in THE
Law of Contracts (1920) and in the Restatement of Contracts (1932)." Ian R. Mac-
neil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 855 n.2 (1978).
See also GRANT GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1979). Presently, there has
been a call for a return to a more formalistic methodology for contract interpreta-
tion. This school of thought has been called neoformalism or Anti-Anti-Formalism.
See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 847 (2000); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 842 (1999); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Com-
mercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781 (1999); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism,
Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223 (1999). See also
Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND.
L. REV. 57 (2003) (argues in favor of formalism; formalism is unlikely to triumph;
and it remains a part of the law).
4. Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author).
5. LLEWELLYN, supra note 3 (argues that the modern era of legal thought was
not new in the sense of novelty, but a return to an earlier era of legal thought he
called Grand Style reasoning, referring to Cardozo as a Grand Style judge).
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FICTION OF NONINTERVENTIONISM
The essay asserts that the best part of Cardozo's opinions
in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, and in his other contract cases, was
his expert use of contextual evidence. What this essay does not
suggest is that Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon was very original in its
implication of the duty of reasonable efforts. Instead, the essay
argues that legal formalism never reached the level of domi-
nance over contract law as represented in most historical ac-
counts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, an
analysis of the cases cited by Cardozo in Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, and other cases that predated his opinion, show a rela-
tively flexible contract law-one that took account of context,
implied duties and completed incomplete contracts.
Professor Pratt offers Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as typical of
the law's response to the uncertainty of the late nineteenth cen-
tury.6 Cardozo is seen as balancing the pressing injustice of a
particular case with the dictates of freedom of contract.7 He did
this by rejecting freedom of contract as formulated under legal
formalism. In its place, he advanced a vision of freedom of con-
tract premised on a contextual understanding of the written
agreement. Finding the true agreement of the parties required
an interpretive methodology based upon the full context of the
contract. The narrow viewfinder provided by a plain meaning
and four-corners interpretation of contracts either had to be
abandoned or broadly expanded in most cases.
This essay will focus on Cardozo's contextual mode of inter-
pretation.8 Part II examines the legal context of the case and
6. Pratt, supra note 3, at 419.
7. Professor Cunningham states that Cardozo was an expert in the "ability to
work within received doctrine and to achieve a richer balance of both fairness and
efficiency of consensual exchange." Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Pos-
ner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1398 (1995).
8. By singling out Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon for analysis there is the fear that it
may not be the clearest example of Cardozo's jurisprudence. It is important to
remember that from 1913 to 1930 Cardozo wrote 470 majority opinions sitting on
the New York Court of Appeals. Bernard L. Sheintag, The Opinions and Writings
of Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 597, 597 (1930). Cardozo's
dominance over the court is apparent if one considers that during that same
timeframe he wrote only fifteen concurring and fifteen dissenting opinions. Id. In
fact, Llewellyn summarizes Cardozo's contract jurisprudence as a "campaign to
put the reading of a commercial document [in context and not] .. .the Langston-
Williston rigidities of 'basic' contract theory." LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 115.
This campaign focused on a "commercial reading" of business contracts. Id. at 116.
Again he refers to "Cardozo's ten-year campaign, begun in 1914, to render stan-
2008] 317
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challenges the notion of the originality of Cardozo's opinion.
Part II also offers some alternative explanations for Cardozo's
decision. Part III reviews the factual context of Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon. The facts used by Cardozo highlight his context-
oriented interpretive methodology. Part IV offers an opinion of
the meaning and importance of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. The
essay concludes that the true innovation in the case was the
offering of a contextual means of interpretation.
II. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
This part will examine the originality of Cardozo's opinion
by looking at cases that predated Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. It
will argue that the implication of duties and the salvaging of
incomplete contracts were firmly established prior to Cardozo's
recognition of the implied duty to use reasonable efforts. The
second section offers some alternative explanations or ratio-
nales for Cardozo's opinion, including the formality of contracts,
the equity powers of courts and the "mercy" rationale.
A. The Unoriginal Nature of the Cardozo Opinion
Beyond the symbolism that the case came to represent, the
Cardozo opinion was not particularly original. His famous "in-
stinct with an obligation" was borrowed. 9 Contract law in gen-
eral was working out new legal concepts to respond to the
reality of a modern economy. The concepts of the implication of
reasonable efforts and good faith had been brewing for at least
fifty-years prior to Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. As noted by Judge
Posner: "The contractual duty of good faith is thus not some
dard in the reading of a commercial document the full use of its commercial back-
ground and of general commercial sense." Id. at 242.
9. McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div. 1909). Holding that
it is true that plaintiff does not by precise words engage to employ defendant
for the term specified, but the whole contract is instinct with such an obliga-
tion on its part, and there can be no doubt that upon a fair construction it
imports a hiring by the plaintiff as well as an obligation to serve by
defendant.
Id. (emphasis added). The original authorship of the phrase is often ignored by
legal scholars. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative
Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1815, 1825 (1991) (explain-
ing an apparently silent contract may nonetheless, in Cardozo's famous phrase, be
"instinct with an obligation").
[Vol. 28:315318
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newfangled bit of welfare-state paternalism or the sediment of
an altruistic strain in contract law and we are therefore not sur-
prised to find the essentials of the modern doctrine well estab-
lished in nineteenth-century cases." 10 Posner cites Cardozo in
Lady, Lucy Duff-Gordon for the proposition that courts are em-
powered to imply terms into a contract based upon the parties'
purpose for entering into their contract or, in the alternative, to
make "sense" of the contract." In fact, it was the trial court in
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon that held the agreement required
Wood to "exercise his 'bona fide judgment'-a requirement the
judge thought sufficient to give content to Wood's obligation and
thus make the agreement enforceable." 2 The difference be-
tween the lower court's and Cardozo's reasoning was that the
former premised the implication of duty on good faith grounds
and the later on reasonable efforts. The former goes to motive;
the later resorts to more objective criteria of commercial reason-
ableness. 3 Nonetheless, both Cardozo and the trial court sal-
vaged the contract through the implication of duty.
The concepts of implied terms and the need for best or rea-
sonable efforts have a long history that preceded Lady, Lucy
Duff-Gordon. The courts had developed the notions of good
faith and reasonableness to counter the illusory charge in the
related area of output and requirements contracts. 4 Such
cases, along with exclusive sales or agency contracts and exclu-
sive license agreements, are all captured in Cardozo's ground
rule that "[w]e are not to suppose that one party was to be
10. Market Street Assocs. Ltd. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th. Cir. 1991) (Pos-
ner, J.) (citing two 1886 New York cases: Marsh v. Masterton, 5 N.E. 59, 63 (N.Y.
1886) (good faith in employment context), and Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins.
Co., 4 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1886) (bad faith in the settlement of an insurance claim)).
11. Id. at 596.
12. Pratt, supra note 3, at 420.
13. Of course, courts often look to trade usage and business custom to deter-
mine if the conduct in question is to be considered an act of bad faith.
14. In the early agency cases, reference to output and requirement contracts
are often made. See, e.g., Commercial Wood & Cement Co. v. Northampton Port-
land Cement Co., 100 N.Y.S. 960 (App. Div. 1906) (involving an exclusive selling
agreement; the concurring opinion by Judge Ingraham refers to a case involving a
shipping contract in which one party agrees to provide transit for an unspecified
amount of cargo and simply groups this type of agreement, along with exclusive
agency and supply contracts, as illusory).
20081 319
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placed at the mercy of the other."15 In given cases, this meant
avoiding the finding of lack of mutuality of obligation.
As noted above, the illusory restraint in the consideration
requirement was presenting problems in other areas of contract
law. Another example was presented in Professor Edwin Patter-
son's two-part article in the 1921 volume of the Iowa Law Bulle-
tin.16 His analysis involved the illusory charge in sale on
approval contracts. He notes two theories of sufficiency of con-
sideration. Under the Willistonian view such agreements were
unenforceable because the buyer had the choice to reject the
goods if not satisfied. Such an agreement is illusory because
under the Willistonian construct of consideration the elements
of benefit or detriment are not satisfied from the buyer's per-
spective. If the buyer rejects the goods, then the seller would
not receive a benefit and the buyer would not incur a detriment.
Patterson argues that the more enlightened view is that of Pro-
fessor Ames. That view would recognize any promise as consti-
tuting sufficient consideration. Thus, a promise or implied
promise to inspect the goods as to quality before making a deci-
sion would be sufficient consideration. 7
The 1906 case of Commercial Wood & Cement Co. v. North-
ampton Portland Cement Co.' involved a contract providing a
selling agent with a five-year right to sell a manufacturer's en-
tire supply of cement. The court noted that the agent company
15. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
16. Edwin Patterson, Illusory Promises and Promisor's Options, 6 IowA L.
BULL. 129, 136-37 (1921).
17. The duty of reasonable inspection can also be judged under the standard
of good faith. "[Tihe limitation is laid down that the buyer in deciding, act in good
faith, and not for the mere purpose of avoiding an obligation." Id. at 149 (citing
Wetters v. Otto, 162 N.W. 12 (Iowa 1917)). Patterson notes that this was an amal-
gamation of two of the prevailing views on the subject: the "New York rule" of
reasonable satisfaction and the "Massachusetts rule" of honest satisfaction. Id. at
146.
18. Commercial Wood, 100 N.Y.S. at 960. The court discussed the illusory
claim but decided the case on the alternative defense that the corporate officers
involved did not have capacity to bind the corporation. In dicta, Justice Houghton
states that:
We are inclined to the opinion that a covenant to use best endeavors to sell
may be read into the contract, but our view of the contract itself and lack of
authority on the part of the executive committee to enter into it renders a
determination of that question unnecessary.
Id. at 963.
320 [Vol. 28:315
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"did not agree, except by such implication as the law might
raise, to make any sales, or endeavor to make any, and specifi-
cally bound itself to do nothing except to keep a set of books in
the name of defendant, showing sales and credits."19 As to the
illusory nature of the agreement, the court stated that:
It is urged that the contract lacks mutuality in that the plaintiff
did not covenant to make any sales or to use its best endeavors to
do so. Whether a covenant will be read into a contract where
there is no express agreement to perform depends upon the intent
of the parties gathered from the instrument and the surrounding
circumstances.20
So, in excess of a decade before the Lady Duff-Gordon deci-
sion the recognition of a best efforts duty in agency contracts
was evolving.
The language of incomplete contracts and implied terms
can be traced back in time by looking at the chain cites listed in
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. In 1868, the United States Supreme
Court in Hudson Canal Co. v. Penn Coal Co.2 1 stated that an
[u]ndoubtedly necessary implication is as much a part of an in-
strument as if that which is so implied was plainly expressed, but
omissions or defects in written instruments cannot be supplied by
virtue of that rule unless the implication results from the lan-
guage employed in the instrument, or is indispensable to carry
the intention of the parties into effect. 22
Justice Clifford elaborated the general principles of a contex-
tual mode of contract interpretation:
Instruments inartificially drafted, or where the language em-
ployed is obscure, imperfect, or ambiguous, are always open to
construction ... but the power of a court of common law extends
no further than to collect such intention from the language em-
ployed as applied to the subject-matter, in view of the surround-
ing circumstances.23
19. Id. at 961.
20. Id. at 963 (citing Carney v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 57 N.E. 78 (N.Y. 1900);
Caldwell v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 65 N.Y.S. 826 (App. Div. 1900)).
21. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 75 U.S. 276
(1868).
22. Id. at 288.
23. Id. at 290. Interestingly, Justice Clifford cites the New York case, Tipton
v. Feitner, 20 N.Y. 425 (1859).
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The Court advanced the notion that agreements that are "ob-
scure, imperfect, or ambiguous" are not to be presumed to fail
for indefiniteness. The word "imperfect" seems to be something
broader than "ambiguous." Imperfect is broad enough to in-
clude the notion of incomplete contracts. The recognition of the
enforceability of an incomplete contract leads to the power to
imply terms and duties from the "surrounding circumstances."
The Michigan Supreme Court, as cited by Cardozo, had pre-
viously recognized exclusive agency agreements as a special
class of cases. In the 1891 case of Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral
Spring Co., 24 the court put the notion of implied duty to use rea-
sonable efforts simply: "One who receives goods on commission
does not usually expressly agree to do anything, but there is in
this class of cases an implied agreement, sufficient to support
the promise and contract. '25 Thus, the innovation of implied du-
ties attached to Cardozo's opinion in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
already existed in the law.
Cardozo cited his own opinion in Moran v. Standard Oil
Company ("Moran v. Standard Oil").26 In Moran v. Standard
Oil, Cardozo interpreted what is called an employment con-
tract, but which is really an independent contract agreement, in
which a salesman agrees to sell a manufacturer's paint products
in exchange for commissions. The lower court held that the con-
tract was not enforceable since the manufacturer had the right
to terminate the agreement at will.27 Cardozo rejected this in-
terpretation by arguing that a contract that obligates a sales-
person to sell exclusively the products of another for a five-year
period is implicitly a contract to employ the salesperson for that
period of time.28
24. Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral Spring Co., 50 N.W. 319 (Mich. 1891).
25. Id. at 321.
26. Moran v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914).
27. Id. at 220.
28. Cardozo states that:
The law, in construing the common speech of men, is not so nice in its
judgments as the defendant's argument assumes. It does not look for pre-
cise balance of phrase, promise matched against promise in perfect equilib-
rium. It does not seek such qualities even in written contracts, unless
perhaps the most formal and deliberate, and least of all does it seek them
where the words are chosen by the master under legal advice, and accepted
by the servant without the aid of like instruction.
Id. at 221.
[Vol. 28:315
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Other decisions, predating Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, sup-
port the claim of unoriginality. In 1859, Judge Senden of the
New York Court of Appeals held that whether conditions in a
contract are dependent or independent "is always a question of
construction, depending upon the terms of the contract, its sub-
ject matter, and the circumstances under which it was made."29
In Wells v. Alexandre,30 some twenty-six years predating Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a re-
quirements contract. The agreement in this case consisted of
an exchange of two one paragraph letters. The agreement pro-
vided that the seller would supply coal for the buyer's steam-
ship company. The agreement detailed three of the buyer's
steamship routes, but added that it would also supply coal for
other steamships of the buyer if the buyer "wished it." 31 The
court reasoned that:
[T]he evident intention of the parties was that the plaintiff should
furnish to the defendants all the coal which the steamers named
should require in the work in which they were employed for the
year ensuing, and that the parties should perform all needful acts
to give effect to the agreement; therefore, if a notice was requisite
to its proper execution, a covenant to give such notice will be in-
ferred, for any other construction would make the contract unrea-
sonable and place one of the parties entirely at the mercy of the
other.32
The court held the requirements contract enforceable by
disregarding the buyer's right to expand its requirements as it
wished. The court instead asserted that the coal needs of the
three specified steamship lines made the quantity term deter-
minable. As noted in the above quote, the court was willing to
imply all "needful acts to give effect to the agreement." This
decision gives a broad scope to the courts' power to imply terms.
Also note, the court in the final segment of the quote uses the
"mercy" rationale employed by Cardozo in numerous opinions.
The mercy rationale will be discussed in Part II.B.3.
Ultimately, no one man or common law court can take
credit for general trends in the law. By the late nineteenth-cen-
29. Tipton v. Feitner, 20 N.Y. 423 (1859).
30. Wells v. Alexandre, 29 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1891).
31. Read v. Spaulding, 30 N.Y. 630, 642-43 (1864).
32. Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
323
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tury, the law of contract interpretation was in the process of
transformation. This transformation included the recognition
of the complexity of modern contracting and the need for
greater interpretive flexibility. In essence, what Cardozo, and
other judges, did was look for answers not within contract law
but outside in the real workings of commercial transactions.
Cardozo's interpretive methodology or contextualism will be
more fully explored in Part III.
What is asserted here is that Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon is an
example of the renewed focus of contract interpretation on con-
textualism. What is not asserted here is that Cardozo's implica-
tion of a duty of reasonable efforts was an innovation in the law
itself. The next two sections will further explore the claim of the
unoriginality of Cardozo's opinion from the perspective of legal
development. The first section notes the claim of Professor
Kreitner that the transformation of contract law from its classi-
cal phase to its modern phase in the early twentieth century is a
false historical narrative. The second section will argue that
the implied duties attributed to status in the nineteen century
continued into the modem era of contract law.33 As such, the
implication of the duty of reasonable efforts in Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon was already embedded in classical contract law.
1. The Fiction of Noninterventionism in Classical
Contract Law
Professor Kreitner has recently challenged the historical
narrative that the late nineteenth century was the high point of
freedom of contract's noninterventionism. 34 Instead, he argues
that "[e]ven at the height of the classical period-the period
that is considered the model of formalist adjudication-judges
actively completed parties' incomplete contracts [often through]
the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing."35 Profes-
sor Kreitner argues that the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries were not times of unfettered freedom of contract,
of a contract law based purely on will theory or consent theory,
33. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917)
(arguing that the movement from status to contract is cyclical).
34. Roy KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (2007).
35. Id. at 164.
[Vol. 28:315
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or one when courts engaged solely in formalistic, non-contextual
interpretation. 36 The previous section on the unoriginality of
the Cardozo opinion and the notion of implied duties confirms
Kreitner's assessment of the false historical narrative that un-
derlies current debate on incomplete contracts and default
rulesA7 The next section elaborates on this idea of a false nar-
rative. It asserts that the implied duties that characterized sta-
tus relations prior to the age of legal formalism or classical
contract law continued throughout the classical period.
2. Formalism's Failure to Expunge Implied Duties From
Contract Law
The case law suggests that the notion of status or implied
duties was never completely expunged by the legal formalism of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 38 The de-
marcation between the age of legal formalism or classical con-
tract law and modern legal thought cannot be confined to the
years often attributed to those eras. 39 In the area of contract
interpretation, any changes in methodology were changes in de-
gree and not changes in kind. The contextualism and flexibility
of interpretation associated with modern contract law existed in
the age of legal formalism. Cardozo's implication of an implied
36. Id. at 197. See also WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (arguing that nineteenth
century America was characterized by a high degree of government regulation of
business and society). Contract law has always been primarily a rule-based sys-
tem whether in the age of legal formalism or modern contract law. Legal realism
seen as a movement towards modern contract law, as reflected in Karl Llewellyn
and the Uniform Commercial Code, maintained the "formalism" of fixed and clear
rules. See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11 (2007). Cf. Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1704-05
(1976) (realist belief that standards like "good faith" provided more certainty than
a system of dense rules). See also Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revi-
siting the Question of Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1933-34 (2001)
(Langdell as caricature; classical theorists were never "completely indifferent to
the social justification of rules and their impact").
37. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Charny, supra note 9.
38. See generally KREITNER, supra note 34 (making a strong case for the argu-
ment that the history of contract law understood as a "progression" from formalism
to modern legal thought is false).
39. Id.
2008] 325
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duty and use of contextual evidence were not foreign to the con-
tract law of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Simply put, even though the duty of reasonable efforts may
not have been expressly stated, the use of good faith and busi-
ness usage to imply duties in contracts had long been estab-
lished. One can look at the Eighth Edition of Parsons on
Contracts ("Parsons-Williston")40 in support of this proposition.
The Eight Edition was edited by Samuel Williston and was pub-
lished in 1893. Williston's formalism is evident in much of the
treatise. The chapter on construction and interpretation
begins:
The importance of a just and rational construction of every con-
tract .. is obvious. But the importance of having this construc-
tion regulated by law, guided always by distinct principles, and in
a way made uniform in practice.., we think [is] as certain and as
great.41
Nonetheless, the possibility of implication of meaning from
outside of the written text is also recognized. In the first foot-
note, Williston cites Lieber for the proposition that "construc-
tion is the drawing of conclusions respecting the subjects that
lie beyond the direct expression of the text-conclusions which
are in the spirit though not within the letter of the text."42 Par-
sons-Williston notes that "[t]he law ... frequently supplies by
its implication the wants of express agreements between the
parties."43
It is important to note that the law of agency is rather de-
veloped by 1893 as expressed in Parsons-Williston's treatise.
Within the discourse, the idea of a duty to use reasonable or
best efforts in the exercise of an agent's duties is implicit. The
treatise notes that when an agent has "no instructions, or par-
tial instructions, his duty will depend upon the intention and
understanding of the parties. This may be gathered from the
circumstances of the case, and especially from the general cus-
tom and usage in relation to that kind of business." 44 Later they
40. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (Samuel Williston ed., 8th
ed. 1893).
41. Id. at 609.
42. Id. at 609, n.(a).
43. Id. at 631.
44. Id. at 84-85.
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state, "an agent is bound to great diligence and care for his prin-
cipal; not the utmost possible, but all that a reasonable man
under the similar circumstances would take of his own
affairs."45
Metcalf on Contracts, a noted 1871 treatise, recognizes the
nature of an agreement or transaction-type as a rule of con-
struction: "The subject matter of an agreement is to be consid-
ered in construing the terms of it, which are to be understood in
the sense most agreeable to the nature of the agreement."46
Bishop on Contracts adds that a "contract may be implied by the
law out of the terms of an express one, viewed in connection
with the circumstances and the subject."47 Bishop further
states that "men, when they speak, and even when they write,
do not put all their meaning into words. From this fact grows
the proposition that, in law, they will often be understood to
mean, while contracting, more than they say."48
The courts often were willing to imply duties and terms in
commercial law cases throughout the age of legal formalism. In
the area of the implication of trade usage, Lord Mansfield in an
insurance contract dispute asserts that: "'Every underwriter is
presumed to be acquainted with the practice of the trade he in-
sures, and if he does not know it, he ought to inform himself."' 49
The U.S. Supreme court in Hearne v. Marine Insurance Co. 50
stated that in the interpretation of contracts the court should
ask: "[W]hat did they mean by the language they employed?" 51
Relating to that meaning the court notes that "[wihat is implied
is as effectual as what is expressed." 52 The New York Court of
Appeals in the 1878 case of Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill
Co. 53 used the language of implication. The case involved a li-
censor licensing its product to a steel company for manufacture
and sale. When the manufacturer failed to fill orders of would-
45. Id. at 88.
46. THERON METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 278 (1871).
47. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, THE DOCTRINES OF CONTRACT LAW § 5, at 3 (1878).
48. Id. § 95, at 35.
49. Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., 87 U.S. 488, 492 (1874) (quoting Noble v. Ken-
noway, 2 Doug. 513 (1847)).
50. Id. (declining to admit an alleged usage since the contract was clear as to
the issue in question).
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id.
53. Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 74 N.Y. 15 (1878).
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be buyers of the licensor's product, the licensor sued for breach
of contract. The manufacturer argued that it did not have an
obligation to fill all orders for the product but only was obli-
gated to pay royalties when it sold the product. In analyzing
the written agreement, the court noted that it was "drawn with-
out as much regard to form as to substance, and the parties
were content to give expression to their general intent, without
studying accuracy or fitness of expression in detail, or setting
forth the positive obligations with technical precision."5 4 The
court held that although the contract failed to expressly state
the manufacturer-licensee's obligation, the fact that it had an
exclusive right to sell was grounds to imply a duty to use "all
diligence in their manufacture and sale."55
The New York Court of Appeals dealt with the issues of for-
malities and the enforceability of contracts in Sanders v. Pot-
tlitzer Bros. Fruit Co.5 6 In that case two merchants exchanged
letters for the sale of apples, the buyer's alleged acceptance
stated that the seller should "wire acceptance." The court held
that even though a formal agreement was contemplated it did
not prevent the court from finding a contract based on their cor-
respondence. It further held that if the parties came to an
agreement through their correspondence, and one of the parties
inserted terms into the formal written agreement that had not
been previously agreed upon, then that party was in breach of
the contract entered into through the correspondence. The
court further noted that if the additional terms did not reflect
the terms "clearly expressed in the correspondence" or "implied
from the transaction," then they could not preclude the finding
of a contract previously agreed upon.57
A most telling New York case is Creamer v. Metropolitan
Securities Co.58 which was decided ten years before Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon. The case involved a contract for the assignment
of railroad properties and related franchises. These franchises
included a clause in their charters requiring the owner to pay
all gross earnings over to the municipality. The buyer-assignee
54. Id. at 23.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 39 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1894).
57. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
58. Creamer v. Metro. Sec. Co., 105 N.Y.S. 28 (App. Div. 1907).
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(buyer) agreed to pay a smaller sum for the franchises and
properties and a much larger sum later in the event the legisla-
ture removed the restriction. The seller-assignor (seller) sued
the buyer for breach of contract based on the buyer's failure to
test the validity of the restriction in the legislature. The court,
in a 5-to-O decision, held that the buyer had an implied duty to
challenge the validity of the legislation though litigation. 59
The court first noted that the "franchise was obviously
without value as it stood at the time this contract was made
.... "60 Judge Woodward states:
The case is thus brought within the rule that 'where there is no
express agreement which can be enforced .. .the law will imply
one; that is, will impute a promise, or intend that one was made.
And such implication will always exist where equity and justice
[require] the party to do the thing in question, even though it ex-
pressly appears that he never actually made the promise or agree-
ment which by such implication the law attributes to him.' 61
Woodward held that there was an implied promise to take steps
to test the right to construct and operate for profit a railroad
under the franchises' charters.
One of the cases cited in Woodward's opinion is even more
apropos regarding the implication of duties. In Genet v. D.H. &
C. Co.,62 Judge Finch states that implied promises
always exist where equity and justice require the party to do or to
refrain from doing the thing in question; where the covenant on
one side involves some corresponding obligation on the other;
where, by the relations of the parties and the subject-matter of
the contract, a duty is owing by one not expressly bound by the
contract to the other party in reference to the subject of it.63
59. Id.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 33 (quoting Scrantom v. Booth, 29 Barb. 171, 174 (N.Y.Sup. 1859));
see also Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mills Co., 6 Hun, 591; Wilson v. Mechanical
Orguinette Co., 63 N.E. 550 (N.Y. 1902); Genet v. D. & H. C. Co., 32 N.E. 1078
(N.Y. 1893).
62. Genet, 32 N.E. 1078.
63. Id. at 1094. See also Dermott v. New York, 1 N.E. 242, 246 (N.Y. 1885).
The law will, sometimes, in the absence of express stipulation on the sub-
ject, infer a contract or promise from one party to the other from the nature
of the transaction, or the supposed intention of the parties, where the cir-
cumstances would seem to authorize the assumption that such an obligation
was within the contemplation of the parties when making their contract.
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The case involved a mineral lease between a property owner
and a coal company. The coal company was to pay royalties for
merchantable coal extracted based upon the opinion of its su-
perintendent or a selected inspector. The owner brought suit to
"recover damages against the defendant for not mining the coal
with reasonable diligence." 4 The contract provided for a mini-
mum royalty whether the land was mined or not. The coal com-
pany asserted the minimum royalty was its only obligation
under the contract; that and a royalty on any quantity it elected
to mine above the minimum amount. The court held that de-
spite the minimum royalty (based on 20,000 tons per year) both
parties expected and intended that a much larger quantity
would be extracted since the property was estimated to possess
4,000,000 tons of coal. Unfortunately, the coal company negli-
gently constructed the mines and a subsequent collapse de-
stroyed the ability to do further mining. The court reasoned
that the "equity of an implied promise is strong and clear. Good
faith, honest dealing, business candor and fairness require that
this contract should be enforced in the sense and with the
meaning which was in the mind of both parties at the time of its
execution." 65 The court then cites the trial court for the pro-
positions that the coal company had acted "entirely subversive
of the spirit of the contract" and that "the execution of the con-
tract in good faith was fully contemplated."66
The above review of cases demonstrates that the implica-
tion of promises and the implied duty of good faith had already
arrived in contract law well in advance of Cardozo's opinion in
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. In fact, the line of New York cases
traced above, including Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. in
1878, Dermott v. State of New York in 1885, Genet v. D.H. & C.
Co. in 1893, and Creamer v. Metropolitan Securities Co. in 1907,
illustrates the firm standing of implied terms prior to Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon. Other state courts were arriving at similar
conclusions. 67 First, contracting parties had a general duty of
Id.
64. Genet, 32 N.E. at 1103 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., Luther v. Bash, 112 N.E. 110, 111 (Ind. App. 1916) (implying the
term that a realtor's two-percent commission was to be based on the sale price;
reasoning that such a term could be "fairly implied from the terms or nature of an
330 [Vol. 28:315
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good faith, and when necessary due diligence, in the perform-
ance of their contracts. Second, the courts would imply such du-
ties and terms when the general intent to enter a contract was
apparent. Third, the courts would look to the surrounding cir-
cumstances when implying obligations into contracts. These
conclusions reflect a trend both inside and outside of New York
well in advance of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.
B. Alternative Explanations
This section will explore three, more or less plausible, alter-
native explanations for the Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon decision.
The first looks at the importance of formality in the recognition
and enforcement of a writing as a contract. The second expla-
nation reviews the rationales for the decision as lying in the
court's equity jurisdiction, namely, unconscionability. The final
explanation focuses on the "mercy" rationale found in a number
of Cardozo's opinions. It argues that the seemingly disparate
Cardozo opinions in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon and Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co. ("Sun
Printing")68 are explainable as reflecting the tension between
rule flexibility and rule certainty.
1. Importance of Form in Contract Law
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon can be understood as a considera-
tion case but not a case involving the illusory issue. It is more a
case of dealing with the consideration doctrine's definiteness of
instrument is .... In other words what is implied in an express contract is as
much a part of the contract as what is expressed."); Mississippi & D. S.S. Co. v.
Swift, 19 A. 1066 (Me. 1894) (holding that a written agreement is not needed if the
parties intended to enter a contract before the formal signing of the agreement).
68. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E.
470, 471 (N.Y. 1923) ("Nothing in the wording discloses the intention of the seller
to place itself to that extent at the mercy of the buyer."). In Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, Cardozo states: "We are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at
the mercy of the other." Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y.
1917). For more recent analysis of the "mercy" rationale in the enforcement of
standard forms and the duty of good faith, see W. David Slawson, Contractual Dis-
cretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contracting by Standard Form,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853 (arguing that the representations and context of con-
sumer and form giver should be viewed as the contract and the standard form as
an exercise of "contractual discretionary power") and Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV.
369 (1980) ("discretion in performance").
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terms requirement. Given the year, and the vestiges of legal
formalism, the case demonstrates the importance of form and
substance in contract law. Form is represented by the nature of
the parties, the transaction, and the agreement. This was a
commercial transaction between parties that were sophisticated
or at the least had sophisticated advisers. 69 Cardozo notes that
the agreement was "signed by both parties,"70 that it possessed
a "wealth of recitals" 71 and "many other terms,"72 including the
duty to account and prevent intellectual property infringe-
ment. 73 And although the terms would be illusory in the event
that Wood failed to procure any endorsements, Cardozo notes
that "it helps to enforce the conclusion that the plaintiff had
some duties."74 The agreement and surrounding circumstances
possessed the form of contract. This then enabled Cardozo to
give substance to that contract.
Without entering a debate over the importance of form in
contract law,75 it is difficult to doubt that the parties did not
intend anything other than to enter into a binding agreement.
The formality of the list of "Whereas" clauses76 is the language
of formal contracts, especially in an age when the litany of pre-
contractual-quasi-contractual instruments had yet to blossom.
Although the nature of "Whereas clauses" are mere statements
of fact and not binding obligations, their presence indicates the
nature of a formal contract. Finally, as championed by Llewel-
lyn, form can be found in the transaction-type chosen by the
parties. 77 In implying reasonable efforts, Cardozo was recogniz-
69. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 50 (2007).
70. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 234 (3d ed. 1987)
(characterizing the agreement as "an elaborate written instrument").
74. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 215 (emphasis original).
75. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adju-
dication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION
IN A LEGAL SYSTEM-A GENERAL STUDY (2006); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & PATRICK S.
ATIYAH, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2002).
76. See GOLDBERG, supra note 69, at 50-51.
77. The phrase is borrowed from Llewellyn's notion of "situation sense." See
LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 121-57. Llewellyn describes the need to frame deci-
sions around new types of transactions:
It is dangerous business, this setting up 'types' of transactions. But the job
needs doing, it needs doing until it gets done right. Our fields of law, our
[Vol. 28:315332
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ing the "essential economic function"78 of a specific transaction-
type. 79
2. Law of Equity: Unconscionability and Restitution 80
Cardozo cited the case of Phoenix Hementic Co. v. Filtrine
Manufacturing8l which involved an exclusive sales agreement.
At some point, the agent stopped marketing and placing orders
for the manufacturer's product. In a per curium opinion, an ap-
pellate division court in New York held that due to the fact that
the manufacturer was to use the agent as its exclusive seller
there was an implied duty on the agent to use reasonable efforts
to market and sell the manufacturer's product. The court's im-
plication of the duty of reasonable efforts was borrowed from
equity jurisprudence: "[T]he law will intend a promise, when eq-
uity and justice require the party to do the thing in question,
even though it expressly appears that he never actually made
the promise or agreement, which by such implication the law
attributes to him."82 This statement indicates that even if a
party can prove no intention to be obligated, the court is pre-
pared to imply such obligation through its equity powers. Here,
the objective standard of implied terms, such as trade usage
and custom, is used to trump evidence of the promisor's subjec-
tive intent. The content of the implied term is implied through
extrinsic evidence. But, the phrase "expressly appears" indi-
patterns of legal thinking, our legal concepts, have grown up each one
around some 'type' of occurrence or transaction ....
Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REV. 873, 880-
81 (1939). Llewellyn gives loans as an example of a transaction-type. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 3, at 368.
78. J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 490
(Cal. 1954).
79. Cardozo states that "new times and new manners may call for new stan-
dards and new rules." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS 88 (1977). In the area of contracts, he notes that "[w]e no longer interpret
contracts with meticulous adherence to the letter when in conflict with the spirit."
Id. at 100. Again, he states that "a spirit of realism should bring about a harmony
between present rules and present needs." Id. at 157-58.
80. Cardozo previously noted that courts should interpret, when possible, a
contract to be an equitable-enforceable one and not an inequitable-unenforceable
one: "Intention to make so one-sided an agreement is not to be readily inferred."
Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217, 220 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.).
81. Phoenix Menentic Co. v. Filtrine Mfg., 150 N.Y.S. 193 (App. Div. 1914).
82. Id. at 196.
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cates that the court is referring to objective intent. In sum, this
case, cited by Cardozo is a case of equitable unconscionability.
Cardozo's reference to his opinion in Moran v. Standard
Oils3 implies that the implication of reasonable efforts was not
an attempt to salvage the contract but to make it less one-sided.
If the parties were reversed and Duff-Gordon had brought suit
for non-performance, then the reasonable efforts standard
would be needed, not so much to fulfill the consideration re-
quirement, but as a measure of performance. Interpreting the
standard as "any or no effort" would render the contract hope-
lessly one-sided or unconscionable. Thus, the implication of a
reasonable efforts term can be seen as an exercise of the court's
equity powers.8 4 Karl Llewellyn in reviewing Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon makes this fairness argument:
The plaintiff in [Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon] rests his case upon his
own carefully prepared form agreement, which has as its first es-
sence his own omission of any expression whatsoever of any obli-
gation of any kind on the part of this same plaintiff. We thus
have the familiar situation of a venture in which one party, here
the defendant, has an asset, with what is, in advance, of purely
speculative value. The other party, the present plaintiff, who
drew the agreement, is a marketer eager for profit, but chary of
risk. The legal question presented is whether the plaintiff, while
carefully avoiding all risk in the event of failure, can nevertheless
claim full profit in the event that the market may prove favorable
in its response. The law of consideration joins with the principles
of business decency in giving the answer. And the answer is no.85
Llewellyn's connection of consideration to business decency
relates to the belief in the one-sided or unconscionable nature of
the contract. The main point here is that illusory contracts are
83. Moran, 105 N.E. 217.
84. The unconscionability power was used in equity long before it was codified
in the Uniform Commercial Code. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Con-
sent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Analysis of Law in Action, 33 FL.
ST. L. REV. 1067 (2006). See also LARRY A. DIMATTEo, THE EQUITABLE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 97-99 (2001) (arguing that the implication of duties into contracts has
at its basis concerns of substantive justice).
85. Karl N. Llewellyn, From the Library: A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 7 J.
App. PRAc. & PROCESS 173, 187-88 (2005) (emphasis added) (Harris Trust Lecture
delivered by Professor Llewellyn to a meeting of the Indiana Bar Association and
the Indiana University Law School Association held at Indianapolis on February 8,
1962).
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unenforceable while unconscionable contracts are enforceable
through reformation. Professor Freedman makes the uncon-
scionability analysis more fully in his symposium article on
"formative or positive unconscionability."8 6
The case against the unconscionability argument is that al-
though Wood had previously used a best efforts clause, the re-
cord is unclear as to whether such clauses were commonly used
or had reached the level of trade usage. Goldberg notes that his
review of form books of the era failed to uncover standard ef-
forts clauses.8 7 My review of turn of the century contract trea-
tises also failed to uncover any discussion of efforts clauses or
their implication.88 However, my analysis in Part II.A shows
that the implication of duties and terms, and the use of contex-
tual evidence to do so, were prevalent in the law at that time.
Assuming that efforts clauses or their implication were rel-
atively a new innovation, then it is difficult to argue that
Wood's omission of the clause in preparing the Duff-Gordon con-
tact was overreaching in any way. Another reason can be of-
fered for the lack of use of equitable unconscionability. It is
simply the fact that courts have elected to use the good faith
performance doctrine for the supplying of terms or gap-filling
and have generally used the unconscionability doctrine to ex-
punge contracts or unconscionable terms.8 9
The avenue of equity, circa 1917, would have been bolstered
by proving that Wood manipulated the situation to create a one-
sided contract. Professor Goldberg has argued that since it was
86. Monroe H. Freedman, Cardozo's Opinion in Lady Lucy's Case: "Formative
Unconscionability," Impracticality, and Judicial Abuse, 28 PACE L. REV. 395
(2008).
87. GOLDBERG, supra note 69. Professor Pratt asserts that exclusive agency
contracts were common by the time of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon: "The agreement
did not fully define Wood's obligation; he was to do whatever his judgment di-
rected, with the consent of Lucy's manager. In the field of advertising it was
known as an 'open contract."' Pratt, supra note 3, at 431-32. Pratt offers this
rationale for Wood and Duff-Gordon to enter such an open contract: "Both aspects
of the agreement [undefined obligation of Wood and the exclusivity] were conse-
quences of Lucy's and Wood's inability to know in advance what opportunities
might exist for placing her endorsements." Id. at 432. Thus, the agreement freed
Lucy to develop other aspects of her business and reduced Wood's uncertainty and
risk of having to deal with competitors. Id.
88. I reviewed the following treatises: PARSONS, supra note 40; BISHOP, supra
note 47; METCALF, supra note 46.
89. KREITNER, supra note 34, at 178-79.
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Wood's form, the omission of a best efforts clause "was most
likely deliberate."90 There is evidence that Duff-Gordon was
represented by business advisers but not legal counsel and that
Duff-Gordon was "naive" in matters involving exclusive
agency.9 1 Based on these facts, one can see the framework for
an equitable unconscionability argument.9 2 Duff-Gordon could
also have argued in the alternative-that if the court recog-
nized a contract-Wood should be found to have initially
breached the contract by failing to use reasonable efforts.9 3
Duff-Gordon's alternative argument would have required the
court to define reasonable efforts to determine whether Woods
had exercised such efforts. Unfortunately, there is nothing in
the facts that indicate the level of Wood's efforts on behalf of
Duff-Gordon.9 4
Finally, if Cardozo had decided that the contract was unen-
forceable on lack of mutuality or indefiniteness grounds this
90. GOLDBERG, supra note 69, at 63.
91. Id. This naivety indicates an inequality of bargaining between Wood, the
supplier of the contract, and Duff-Gordon. See also Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequal-
ity of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005) (analysis for the role of
bargaining power in contract law).
92. A "theoretical" equitable estoppel rationale could also be used in the fram-
ing of a hypothetical based on the facts of the Wood-Duff-Gordon contract. In the
hypothetical, Wood would have been the defendant and would claim the illusory
defense. The equitable estoppel rationale rests on the notion that if a contract is
deliberately made vague by one of the parties, then that party should be estopped
from asserting that it is illusory. If Wood knew the contract was illusory on its face
but represented it as a binding agreement, then Cardozo can be seen as interced-
ing to protect the reasonable expectations of the "innocent" party. See generally T.
Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a
Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633 (2007) (applying new legal
theory to the five hundred year old equitable estoppel defense). One can see the
equitable estoppel rationale elsewhere in contract law, such as in the contra prefer-
entem rule.
93. See, e.g., Wells v. Alexandre, 20 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1891) (arguing nonenforce-
ability, and then, in the alternative, arguing the case in the event of a finding of
enforceability). The court notes that the
defendants, on the other hand, contend that the correspondence did not cre-
ate a contract; that if it did, it was a contract for successive deliveries of coal,
to be made only when the defendants should give the plaintiff notice that a
delivery was required, and as notice had not been given, the defendants are
not in default.
Id. at 644.
94. Freedman, supra note 86 at n.36 (citing RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF
LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS, Vol. 3, at 34-38 (William H. Manz ed.
2001)).
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does not mean that he could not have provided a remedy. A
restitution remedy could have been provided through an impli-
cation in law.95 This rationale would argue that Duff-Gordon
was unjustly enriched by the efforts of Wood in the noncontract
scenario. In such a case, Wood would need to provide evidence
that through his efforts, such as advertising, he had made po-
tential customers aware of the possibility of receiving Duff-
Gordon's endorsement. By dealing directly with such customers
Duff-Gordon was unjustly enriched.
3. The 'Mercy' Rationale
Professor Cunningham argues that the key to understand-
ing Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, and other Cardozo opinions, is the
rationale that a contract should not place one party at the
mercy of the other party. Cunningham uses the "mercy" ratio-
nale to harmonize Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon with Cardozo's opin-
ion in Sun Printing.9 6 In Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Cardozo
implied an obligation to salvage an indefinite contract; in Sun
Printing he failed to enforce a contract missing a price term de-
spite the fact that the agreement was for a fixed term and pro-
vided a basis for setting the price.9 7 I will argue that the mercy
rationale offered to explain the different outcomes-implication
versus non-implication of terms-is a faulty one.
The mercy rationale is related to the prevention of injus-
tice. In Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the implication of reasonable
95. The use of restitution as a remedy where a contract fails due to indefinite-
ness was recognized at the time of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. Woodward's 1913
treatise on quasi-contracts make this clear:
A promise so general or indefinite that it does not enable the courts to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the obligation assumed must be regarded as
no promise at all .... A benefit conferred in the honest though mistaken
belief that such a promise is binding ought injustice to be restored. Restitu-
tion is accordingly enforced.
FREDERIC CAMPBELL WOODWARD, LAW OF QuASI CONTRACTS 105 (1913).
96. Cunningham, supra note 7.
97. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E.
470 (N.Y. 1923). The case involved a sixteen-month supply agreement. The price
was set for the first four months and then it was to be agreed upon for the remain-
der of the contract term. The agreement also provided that the maximum price
was not to exceed the rate charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company to its
largest customers. After the first four months expired, the Seller gave advance
notice of its intention to terminate the contract. This notice did not precede any
attempt to negotiate a new price.
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efforts was needed to prevent the finding of an illusory contract.
Justice dictates that in an exclusive agency agreement, the
principal should not be placed at the agent's discretion to per-
form or not to perform. In Sun Printing, there is no illusory
issue. Instead, there was an express, clear agreement. Injus-
tice was not prevented, but was incurred with the non-enforce-
ment of the contract containing a partially open price term.
After analyzing Cardozo's opinion, I will argue that the case
demonstrates for Cardozo the tension between rule flexibility
and rule certainty. In Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Cardozo em-
phasized the importance of rule flexibility. In Sun Printing, he
recognizes the benefits of rule certainty and the dangers of un-
limited rule flexibility.
In Sun Printing, Cardozo's contextual analysis is present
but its application is misplaced. Cardozo ventures outside the
contract to note that market prices were on the rise in 1920.
This explains why the buyer was willing to agree to the maxi-
mum contract price since it represented the prime customer
rate. If the market price rose significantly past that prime rate,
then the possibility for exploitation existed. Instead of follow-
ing that line of argument, however, Cardozo posed a hypotheti-
cal by asking "what the seller's position would be if they had
happened to fall[?]"98 He reasoned that since the parties failed
to insert a term regarding the duration of each price change, the
seller would be subject to continuous reductions in the price
term. The question is why is this a bad thing?
The buyer argued that failing an agreement on a new price,
the price should have been set at the maximum price. Cardozo
sided with the seller by holding that the agreement was an un-
enforceable "agreement to agree." Cardozo noted that if it was
merely a case of open price, then the buyer would have had the
"option" to imply the maximum price. Cardozo held that since
the duration of the to be agreed upon price was also left open,
the agreement failed due to indefiniteness. This is strained
logic since the parties had set prices for the first month and for
the following three month period. Cardozo could have implied
that new prices would be reset on a monthly or quarterly basis.
This course seems especially reasonable given that a price
98. Id. at 471.
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source was accessible. Furthermore, the buyer was willing to
pay the maximum contract price as represented by that price
source.
Cardozo rejected the argument that the seller "was under a
duty, in default of an agreement, to accept a term that would be
reasonable in view of the nature of the transaction and the prac-
tice of the business." 99 This is ultimately what Cardozo did in
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon by implying reasonable obligations
through a contextual inquiry into business practice. Instead,
Cardozo retreated into the nuance of unsubstantiated facts. He
wondered why the record was unclear as to whether the Cana-
dian Export Paper Company rate was fixed for a year or varied
from time to time? He then asserted that there may be a duty of
good faith to negotiate a new price. But, it was the buyer, ac-
cording to Cardozo, not the seller that acted inappropriately by
setting the new price and duration "any way it pleased."'100 This
is not a rational argument given the fact that the buyer had set
the new price at the maximum price allowed by the contract,
that the unexpired portion of the contract was a modest twelve
months, and that the seller's response to the buyer's attempt to
set the price and duration of the price change was to reject any
obligation under the contract. 1 1
If the names were removed, given the Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon case, one would have thought that Cardozo had written
the dissent. Justice Crane, in dissent, noted that the facts
showed merchant parties clearly intending to enter a contract.
They used a standard business form that was a detailed agree-
ment. 10 2 Crane argued that in such cases it is the court's job to
99. Id.
100. Id. at 472.
101. Karl Llewellyn offers a different take on the Cardozo opinion in Sun
Printing. He argues that Cardozo was not backing away from his commercial or
contextual reading of contracts but that he was warning that the contextual infor-
mation is to be provided by the litigating parties-this was a case of "bad plead-
ings!" LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 242 & 242, n.243. He then admits that
Cardozo's opinion was "labored and unsatisfactory," and "a bothering step back-
ward." Id. at 242.
102. Sun Printing, 139 N.E. 470. The contract provided considerable detail,
such as duration of sixteen months, 16,000 tons of paper at the rate of 1,000 tons
per month, "sizes and quality were adequately described," payment on the 20th of
the month subsequent to shipping, the contract had set the prices for the first four
months ($3.74 and $4.00 for months 2 through 4), price to be agreed upon fifteen
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"spell out a binding contract, if it be possible."'10 3 He concluded
that the contract's reference to the rate charged by the Cana-
dian Export Paper Company was a ground for implying a rea-
sonable price term. This he argued would have led to a
"practical result" and, looking to the future, the establishment
of a standard of fair dealing. 0 4
It is difficult to reconcile Cardozo's opinion in Sun Printing
with Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, and the cases cited by Justice
Crane, but I will offer the rationale of rule certainty. Cardozo
feared that the implication of the price and the duration of the
price, as well as tying it to a private price source, would en-
courage speculation and exploitation in future commercial
transactions. Without some limits to the contextual implication
of material terms, parties would intentionally leave gaps in
their contracts. At least in Sun Printing, Cardozo was willing
to allow an injustice in order to stimulate certainty in legal
rules and business transactions.1 0 5
III. Cardozo and Contextualism
Cardozo's approach in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon illustrates,
if not symbolizes, the transition in contract interpretation to the
use of broader sources of contextual evidence to imply meaning
days prior to the expiration of previous period, price was to "in no event to be
higher than the contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian Export Pa-
per Company to its large consumers," and costs of freight to be borne by buyer. Id.
103. Id. at 473 (Crane, J., dissenting).
104. Justice Crane asserts that it would "compel parties to contract in the
light of fair dealing." Id.
105. Fellow New York Court of Appeals Judge Irving Lehman in a memorial
stated that: "He was not content to accept an unjust decision merely because it
rested firmly on old precedents nor, on the other hand, was he content to cast aside
lightly long established rules and precedents merely because they dictated a con-
clusion which might be unfair to a particular litigant." Irving Lehman, A Memo-
rial (July 25, 1938), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN
CARDOZO xiii (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947). Professor White notes, referencing Mor-
timer Adler's critique of the Realists, that "there was certainty and probability in
the law-in the 'demonstration of rules'. . . . This was the insight about the law
which Pound, Cardozo, and others have made, if not analyzed." G. Edward White,
From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1022 (1972) (citing Morti-
mer Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1931)).
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into contacts. 0 6 His interpretative viewfinder went beyond the
four-corners of the contract and the belief that words of contract
could have a single, plain meaning.10 7 In applying contract doc-
trine, Cardozo focused on substance over form; contextual
meaning over facial meaning; and law as consequence over law
as detached. 08 This methodology focused on promoting rule-
based functionality and the promotion of business efficacy. 0 9
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon extended the contextual analysis be-
yond the search for the meaning of the express words of con-
tract to the implication of meaning where the contract was
silent."0
The importance of the case can be seen in two areas. First,
the opening of contract interpretation to broader sources of
meaning. This broader contextualism will be explored in the
106. For a discussion of the role of contextualism in contract interpretation,
see Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 392 (2004).
107. See, e.g., Sun Printing, 139 N.E. 470 (looking outside of the contract to
note that the price of paper was on the rise in 1920). See generally ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, CARDozo 313 (1998) ("Cardozo made important contributions to con-
tract law by considering promises in the context in which they were made.").
108. For an argument for the importance of contextual inquiry to small busi-
nesses, see Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual For-
malism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
233 (2003) (analyzing negative impact of formalistic contract doctrines that deny
small businesses protection of contract rules based upon inequality of bargaining
power).
109. Kaufman relates to this methodology to Cardozo's twenty-year career as
a commercial lawyer: "He understood business arrangements. His judicial opin-
ions reflected his ability to interpret commercial contacts in accordance with busi-
ness usage. As a result, he often found that a contract existed when the
technicalities required to make a contract seemed at first glance not to have been
met." KAUFMAN, supra note 107, at 315.
110. See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Con-
tract Method, 67 CORN. L. REV. 785, 794-95 (1982) ("reason to know" analysis as
method of determining the scope of promises). Under a reason to know analysis
one would ask the following questions to determine if Wood had manifested an
intent to use reasonable efforts: Did Duff-Gordon understand that Wood had made
such a promise? Did Wood know that Duff-Gordon had such an understanding? If
the answers are in the affirmative then such a duty is implied into the contract? If
the answer to the second question is in the negative, then the following questions
would be asked: If Wood did not know of the precise duty, then what contextual
facts did he know? Given that knowledge, and Wood's level of sophistication in
such matters, should Wood have inferred that Duff-Gordon would understand that
such a commitment was made? "If so, [Wood] did have a duty to act with reasona-
ble care to avoid misunderstanding." Id. at 795.
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next section. Second, and for which it is most remembered, the
judicial implication of duties ancillary to express contracts. Al-
though the focus here will be on the former, a brief note on the
later will be offered. The implication of reasonable efforts by
Cardozo is different then the implication of good faith for which
the case is currently associated."1 This confusion is likely due
to what can be called the definitional problem. 112 Clear defini-
tions of reasonable efforts or best efforts have yet to be offered.
Despite the problems of definition, the contextualism provided
by current modes of interpretation, as symbolized by Cardozo,
allow for plausible levels of definitional certainty in particular
cases. It is the recognition of external sources of meaning in
cases like Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon that allows for the implica-
tion of such terms in the first place.
Cardozo was willing to balance the needs of generality
against the justice of smaller categories of law. The search for
smaller categories, 113 due to the increase in specialization of
commercial transactions at the turn of the last century, was a
contextual undertaking. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon is an example
of the abandonment of abstract conceptualism in favor of the
recognition of sub-categories of cases, such as exclusive agency
arrangements. More broadly, the case can be seen as an exam-
ple of an overarching methodology used by Cardozo time and
again to create new law.
The next three sections will analyze the contextual element
of Cardozo's method of contract interpretation. The first section
briefly discusses the type of contextual interpretation exhibited
by Cardozo. The second section will critique Professor
Goldberg's analysis of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. The final sec-
111. E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best
Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1 (1984); Victor P. Goldberg, Great
Contracts Cases: In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1465 (2000).
112. Market St. Assocs. Ltd. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991) (the
definitional problem in the area of the duty of good faith is that "Wisconsin cases
are cryptic as to its meaning though emphatic about its existence").
113. See Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (criticizing abstract legal concepts; law's
concepts needed to be disaggregated around "operative facts"); Karl N. Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 457 (1930)
("The old categories are imposing in their purple, but they are all too big to
handle.").
342 [Vol. 28:315
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/9
FICTION OF NONINTERVENTIONISM
tion examines Cardozo's consequence-focused approach to con-
tract interpretation.
A. Cardozo's Contextualism
The importance of contextual meaning was evident in
United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein114 which involved an
ambiguously worded guaranty. The jury was given the task of
interpreting the word "they" in the agreement. Cardozo de-
scribed the jury's role as "fix[ing] the meaning in the light of all
the circumstances. " 115 In such an inquiry, the plain meaning
rule and the need for clarity of written contracts is greatly di-
minished. 116 In their place, is a search for meaning in the con-
text of the agreement.
Cardozo excelled at tying law application to context. Differ-
ent contexts or categories of cases required different sets of
rules. Thus, construction contracts were different and required
a substantial performance standard; agency contracts were dif-
ferent and required the implication of a reasonable efforts duty.
Different types of breaches required different types of damage
rules-some breaches triggered a cost of replacement remedy
while others dictated a diminishment in value calculation.
At a more basic level, all of Cardozo's innovations, whether
eliminating the privity rule in products liability or crafting the
substantial performance doctrine in non-sales cases, were made
possible by his embrace of an interpretive methodology. Car-
dozo asserts in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon that the "implication of
a promise here finds support in many circumstances." He
looked beyond the four-corners of a relatively detailed agree-
ment to the nature of exclusive agencies and the nature of
Wood's business organization. The legacy of Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, especially combined with other Cardozo cases of the
era, shows the importance of contextualism to Cardozo. 117 The
114. United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 128 N.E. 123 (N.Y. 1920).
115. Id. at 124.
116. Cardozo asserts that "the demon of formalism tempts the intellect with
the lure of scientific order." CARDOZO, supra note 79, at 66.
117. In 1930, Bernard Sheintag had this to say about Cardozo's approach:
"The predominant characteristics of his philosophy are pragmatic-a flexibility,
rather than a dogmatic rigidity; a concern with facts and realities and conse-
quences, rather than with abstractions and formal rules and metaphysical subtle-
ties; a belief in experimentation, inconstant readaptation and revision, rather than
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next section will look at the excellent analysis presented by Pro-
fessor Goldberg in Framing Contract Law. 118
B. Goldberg's Contextual Analysis
Professor Goldberg provides an analysis of the broader con-
text of the would-be contract in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. He
finds that around the same time of the formation of that con-
tract Wood had entered into another agency contract. What he
finds is that the contract, unlike the one in Lucy, Lady-Duff
Gordon, contained an express "best efforts" clause. 119 The pre-
vious contract had led to litigation with the key issue being
Wood's failure to perform as required under the best efforts
clause. 120 From this fact, Goldberg surmises that Wood had de-
liberately not incorporated such a clause in the Duff-Gordon
contract in order to avoid contractual liability.
Goldberg argues that Cardozo got it wrong when he found
consideration through the implication of a reasonable efforts
duty. He argues that these were relatively sophisticated par-
ties, or parties represented by sophisticated advisers, and
therefore, they could have easily placed a "consideration term"
into the contract. The right course, according to Goldberg,
would have found consideration elsewhere in the agreement.' 2'
in 'petrified perfection' and finality." Sheintag supra note 8, at 601. "The impact of
the contextual approach to best efforts clauses is that the analysis of a bound
party's performance will center on the abilities and expectations of the particular
parties to the contract." Zachary Miller, Best Efforts?: Differing Judicial Interpre-
tations of a Familiar Term, 48 ARiz. L. REV. 615, 618 (2006).
118. GOLDBERG, supra note 69, at 43-73. See also Victor P. Goldberg, Desper-
ately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate Impact of U.C.C. Section 2-306 on
Contract Interpretation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 103 (2007) [hereinafter Goldberg, Desper-
ately Seeking Consideration].
119. The Wood-Wilson contract provided that Wood was to "use his best ef-
forts and devote so much of his time as shall be necessary diligently to promote the
sale and licenses" and will use his "best efforts to obtain ... the highest possible
royalty." PAPERS OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT-APPELLATE DMSION, 179 App.
Div. 973 at 28 (1915) (on file with author).
120. See GOLDBERG, supra note 69, at 43-73.
121. Maybe this is a false choice. As Professor Garvin has noted that contract
doctrine often masks false dichotomies in the law: "Indeed, a good many contract
doctrines have come about as attempts to bridge the crevasses of the starker di-
chotomies. Classical consideration doctrine, for instance, is loosened by many sup-
plemental doctrines recognizing that not all promises fall neatly into bargained-for
and not bargained-for." Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichoto-
mies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 295, 296 (2005).
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Failing that finding, Cardozo should have declared it a
noncontract.
Professor Goldberg further argues that the real damage
has been done by the progeny of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon-both
in the case law and the Uniform Commercial Code122-in ex-
panding the standard from reasonable efforts to best efforts, the
problem associated with defining such standards and the un-
necessary implication of the duty into contracts already incorpo-
rating adequate consideration. 123 In Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
Goldberg suggests that consideration could be found in the in-
centive structure built into the contract. Wood's compensation
was dependent upon him procuring endorsements for Duff-
Gordon. The fact that his fifty percent commission rate covered
any endorsements procured by Duff-Gordon directly protected
this incentive by discouraging her from making endorsements
independently. Scott and Kraus make a similar argument, but
note an alternative reason for implying the duty of reasonable
efforts. 24 They note that Wood had other products to promote
"so Lucy needs some assurance that he will promote her prod-
ucts even if he has other products that generate more profit."25
The terms of the contract may provide incentive, but that incen-
tive may be diminished or lost depending on the marginal utili-
ties of such products relative to other clients' products. The
implication of reasonable efforts allocates some of the risk of
relative non-profitability to Wood in exchange for exclusivity. 26
So, is Professor Goldberg correct that Cardozo got it wrong
based on the facts of the case? Goldberg argues that if Cardozo
knew of the earlier contract, then it would have been difficult
for him to rationalize an implied term to use reasonable ef-
122. See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1977).
123. Goldberg, Desperately Seeking Consideration, supra note 118, at 109.
124. ROBERT E. ScoTr & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 106
(Supp. 2007) ("By foregoing the opportunity to work with other marketers, Lucy
hoped to provide an incentive for him to put some effort into marketing her
products.").
125. Id.
126. Id. Scott and Kraus then question this analysis that the implication of a
reasonable efforts duty was not necessary if the agreement was viewed as an op-
tion contract "to market the goods as market conditions dictate." Id. at 107. This
counter-argument does not satisfy the previous analysis' fear that the relative
profitability of other products may diminish incentive to promote Duff-Gordon's
products (especially assuming limited resources on his part).
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forts. 127 This is an argument that since these were sophisti-
cated parties they could have easily inserted a best efforts
clause. The alternative case can also be made. Since these
were sophisticated parties, they could have inserted an express
no duty of best efforts clause. Since they did neither, then the
strongest argument is to imply what a reasonable person would
expect under the circumstances. This is exactly what Cardozo
did.128
An ancillary argument is that the lack of an express term
was not truly a matter of consideration but one of filling in a
gap in the contract. 129 Cardozo's imagination could have fo-
cused on other aspects of the agreement to find consideration.
As noted by the lower appellate court, the contract
provided that the plaintiff (Wood) is to procure such patents, copy-
rights or trade marks as may in his judgment be necessary to pro-
tect the names and such ideas or articles as are affected by the
contract and to take such proceedings as in his judgment may be
necessary to protect [them] .... 130
If Wood had an independent obligation to protect Duff-Gordon
through the procurement of intellectual property protection,
then could that obligation provide sufficient consideration to
bind the contract? The question here is whether this was a
right that Wood was free to exercise or a duty to protect? The
contract use of the phrase "in his judgment" seems to indicate
that he had no obligation only a right. Yet, the language is
more of duty than of right. Cardozo could have found considera-
tion by "implying" or interpreting the infringement protection
language as a contractual duty and not a right.
127. Professor Goldberg indicates that Cardozo was probably unaware of the
other contract: "If Judge Cardozo had been made aware of this other contract, he
would have been hard-pressed to explain why it would be necessary to imply best
efforts .... ." Goldberg, Desperately Seeking Consideration, supra note 118, at 109.
128. I would like to thank W. David Slawson for this thought.
129. Goldberg admits that if this was the case, then the case was rightly de-
cided: "If the Wood rule were only a gap-filler, the problem should disappear if the
contract provides another source of consideration...." Goldberg, Desperately Seek-
ing Consideration, supra note 118, at 110.
130. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 177 A.D. 624, 625 (N.Y. App. Div.
1917).
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C. Cardozo's Consequentialism
A key part of Cardozo's contextualism was forward-look-
ing.131 Cardozo's utilitarianism is evident in his adjustment of
rules and implication of duties. If a rule resulted in an injustice
in what could be deemed a group or category of cases, then the
rule needed adjustment or replacement. Thus, Cardozo be-
lieved in and exercised a form of rule utilitarianism. 132 He un-
derstood the need for rule certainty in contract law that would
be jeopardized through the imposition of ad hoc utilitarian-
ism. 133 Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon and Sun Printing taken to-
gether show the tension between rule adjustment to prevent
injustice and the need for rule certainty. Rule adjustment or
rule creation can be done, and should only be done, when the
adjustment or creation would govern a specifiable group of
cases or transaction-types. It is the recognition of injustice in
defined categories of cases that allowed Cardozo to create the
doctrine of substantial performance, 34 to avoid a strict consid-
eration requirement in charitable subscriptions,135 and to imply
a duty of reasonable efforts in exclusive agency contracts. The
following section will examine Cardozo's consequence-focused
approach by reviewing the famous case of Jacob & Youngs v.
Kent. 36
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent as More Fully Developed Version of
Cardozo's Consequentialism
Cardozo's pronouncement in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon that
the law "has grown from its primitive stage of formalism" is
131. "[T]he wider effect of a rule beyond the particular promise at issue [was]
important to him." KAuFmsN, supra note 107, at 313.
132. Professor Edwin Patterson had this to say about Cardozo's philosophy of
law: "In his insistence upon the appraisal of legal rules and legal institutions in
terms of their social consequences he carries forward the utilitarianism of Jeremy
Bentham and the sociological jurisprudence of Holmes and Pound." Edwin Patter-
son, Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 72 (1939).
133. Cardozo notes that a rule needs to be adjusted if it "yields a result which
is felt to be unjust." But, he warns that a rule "may not be modified at once, for the
attempt to do absolute justice in every single case would make the development
and maintenance of general rules impossible." CARDozo, supra note 79, at 23.
134. Jacobs & Young, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
135. Allegany College v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y.
1927).
136. Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. 889.
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fully developed four years later in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. In
that case, Cardozo's flexible, pragmatic approach to law applica-
tion is evident.
Justice McLaughlin's opinion in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent is
an example of a methodology of interpretation at the heart of
formalism. For McLaughlin, the only operative fact was the
contractor's use of a brand of pipe at variance with what was
stated in the contract. 137 Other contextual evidence as to the
quality of the replacement pipe or the comparative value of the
delivered building was immaterial under a plain meaning inter-
pretation that the pipe was to be "Reading Pipe." The conse-
quence of this fact, unreasonable damages, was of no
importance since the variation in pipe brands triggered a for-
malistic response. First, since the contractor owed a duty of full
or strict performance to the buyer, the buyer's dependent duty
to pay for the building was never triggered. Second, due to this
duty of strict or complete performance the law provided the sin-
gle remedy of replacement cost. The buyer's expectation inter-
est required full performance and therefore, any damage
remedy must be based upon a replacement cost calculation.
McLaughlin's formalism allowed him to deal with the case
summarily since the buyer's obligation to pay was conditional
on full performance. Any breach on the part of the builder pre-
cluded the triggering of that obligation. Stated more succinctly,
all breaches are treatable as equals under this formalistic
approach.
Cardozo looked beyond the law's operative facts of depen-
dent conditions and the replacement value remedy. The addi-
tional information that contextual evidence provided was that
the replacement pipe was of equal or higher quality then the
pipe specified in the contract, along with evidence that the con-
tractor's breach was not willful. Cardozo's broadened contextu-
alism also included recognizing the consequence of applying the
law's replacement cost remedy. In this case, the replacement
remedy was impossible without the contractor incurring prohib-
itive costs.
137. In the words of McLaughlin: "What his reason for requiring this kind of
pipe is of no importance." Id. at 892.
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Cardozo's recognition of the contextual reality presented by
the case made apparent the ill-fit or inefficiency of a doctrine
that treated different categories of cases in the same way.138
Cardozo attacked the formal analysis of dependent-independent
conditions as nonsensical under the circumstances. Cardozo,
however, worked within the received doctrine of dependent-in-
dependent conditions. 139 However, he rejected McLaughlin's as-
sumption that the duty to build completely or fully was a
dependent condition for the buyer's obligation to pay. The issue
was not whether a condition is formally worded or considered as
dependent or independent. The issue is whether the departure
or defect is substantial or collateral.
Cardozo then crafted a rule adjustment based upon the na-
ture of the beach. The use of a different pipe of equal quality
was a minor breach. The fact that the law may view the inter-
related conditions as dependent is significant but not the end of
the analysis. The second stage of the analysis requires a fuller
contextual inquiry to determine such things as whether the
breach was willful, whether the breach substantially deprived
the other party of what she was entitled to expect under the
138. The recognition of different categories of cases allowed Cardozo to retain
received doctrine through a process of bifurcation. Professor Cunningham has
noted that this is the heart of the common law system. "The common law is a
remarkably stable system that constrains judicial discretion through a comple-
ment of initial conditions linking cases over time with the possibility of bifurca-
tions that enable it to chart significant changes in course." Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process: A Preliminary Inquiry, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 747 (2006)
139. Professor Patterson notes that Cardozo "choose neither to follow the arid
terminology of the older jurisprudence nor to invent novel and forbidding terminol-
ogy." Patterson, supra note 132, at 73. This is an example of why Professor
Bridgeman sees Cardozo as acting as a "contextual formalist." "He was, therefore,
not out to undermine or erode the formalities of contract law ... [but] that these
formalities be applied sensibly, with an understanding of the context in which the
exchanges took place." Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo,
Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 186 (2005).
Professor Cunningham also notes Cardozo's ability to effect change in the law
while working within received doctrine. "[Duff-Gordon is an] illustration of Car-
dozo's wider ability to work within the received doctrine and to achieve a richer
balance of both fairness and the efficacy of consensual exchange." Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. AND MARY L.
REV. 1379, 1398 (1995). Professor Pratt in referring to Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
states that "[allthough the forms often remained the same, the content underwent
substantial change." Pratt, supra note 3, at 429.
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contract, 140 and whether the effect of nonperformance signifi-
cantly diminished the value of the result. Based upon a factual
assessment of these factors, Cardozo concluded that the breach
was not willful, the performance met the reasonable expecta-
tions of the buyer and that the value of the finished product
reasonably correlated to the value of the result without the
breach.
The context that Cardozo uses to fabricate the substantial
performance doctrine allowed him to bifurcate contract law's re-
medial response. This context includes a forward-looking esti-
mation of the consequences of rule application. Since the
builder had rendered substantial performance and the nature of
the replacement remedy application (removal and replacement
of pipes in fixed floors and walls) would be inefficient and cata-
strophic, the law needed an alternative remedy for non-mate-
rial, non-willful breaches. Given such results, Cardozo asserts
that such doctrinal symmetry of dependent-independent condi-
tions looses all coherence. In the end, he reasoned that a build-
ing contract is different than a sale of goods contract and the
law needed to respond accordingly.
IV. The Meaning of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon:
Enforcing Incomplete Contracts
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon involved the implication of a duty
of reasonable efforts. Cardozo based this implication on his
analysis of the transaction-type and the characteristics of the
parties.' 4 ' And yet, over the years there has been a merger of
the implication of reasonable efforts with the good faith per-
formance doctrine in the judicial and scholarly analysis of the
case.142 In Furrer v. International Health Assurance Co.,143 for
example, the issue was not whether someone had a duty to use
140. This definition of material or fundamental breach was taken from Article
25 of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 15
U.S.C.A.App. (West 2007).
141. Cardozo asserts that "implication of a promise here finds support in
many circumstances." Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y.
1917).
142. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1381 (characterizing Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon as the case in which Cardozo created the "good faith obligation"). See
also Farnsworth, supra note 111, at 5-7 (discussing Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, 717 F.2d
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a certain level of effort but whether the employer's termination
of the sales agency relationship was unreasonable. The Oregon
Supreme Court, nonetheless, cited Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as
it's primary authority in holding that the termination was
unfair.'"
Justice Scalia offers the insight that the duty of good faith
and the implication of duties based upon the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties are different versions of the same concept.
He cites Cardozo in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon:
[Tihe authorities that invoke, with increasing frequency, an all-
purpose doctrine of 'good faith' are usually if not invariably per-
forming the same function executed (with more elegance and pre-
cision) by Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
when he found that an agreement which did not recite a particu-
lar duty was nonetheless 'instinct with [. . .1 an obligation,' imper-
fectly expressed,' The new formulation may have more appeal to
modern taste since it purports to rely directly upon considerations
of morality and public policy, rather than achieving those objec-
tives obliquely, by honoring the reasonable expectations created
by the autonomous expressions of the contracting parties.145
Although serving the same purpose, Scalia prefers Cardozo's
approach of implied obligations over the use of the amorphous
duty of good faith.146
The danger of confusing best efforts with good faith was
demonstrated in Pinnacle Books v. Harlequin Enterprises
Ltd. 147 which involved a publishing contract that incorporated a
best efforts provision in the renewal clause. The renewal clause
required the parties to use their best efforts to reach a new
agreement. The writer at the end of the publishing contract
671 (2d Cir. 1983)), 7-12 (contrasting good faith with best efforts, and arguing that
the best efforts standard is the "more exacting" of the two standards).
143. Furrer v. Int'l Health Assurance Co., 474 P.2d 759 (1970). See also Lee v.
Seagram, 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon for the impo-
sition of good faith in the exercise of a party's discretion).
144. Lee, 552 F.2d at 764.
145. Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. Scalia notes that "[mlany courts ... were wont to use 'good faith' termi-
nology .... There, as in its modern extension to the full range of contractual du-
ties, the concept of good faith was a surrogate for an implied obligation or
limitation." Id. at 1153.
147. Pinnacle Books v. Harlequin Enters. Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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and after initial attempts at negotiating a renewal signed with
another publishing company. The case involves an unlawful in-
terference claim brought by the first publisher against the sec-
ond publisher. The court held that since the best efforts clause
went to negotiations it was too vague; there was "simply no ob-
jective criteria against which .. .efforts can be measured.' 148
The court here focuses on the definitional problem 149 of deter-
mining a standard to measure efforts. 150 By doing this the court
ignores the real issue of whether the author's termination of ne-
gotiations was done in bad faith. The court noted the plaintiffs
argument that the parties would have reached a renewal agree-
ment if they had proceeded with the "negotiations in good faith
and using their best efforts."'5 ' The key facts being that: (1) the
author's demands had been largely satisfied and (2) the author
signed with the second publisher only after the president of the
first publisher had taken a position with the second publisher.
These facts bolster the claim of bad faith. Yet, the court focused
only on the enforceability of the best efforts clause.
The view offered here has been that the importance of Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, and other Cardozo contract cases, was the
method of interpretation. The contextual inquiry exhibited by
Cardozo was part of a trend in analyzing fact patterns within a
broader context. This contextual mode of interpretation re-
sulted in diminishing the formal requirements of formation,
such as the definiteness component of consideration, mutuality
of obligation and the statute of frauds. 5 2 The use of extrinsic
148. Id. at 121.
149. See, e.g., Zachary Miller, Best Efforts?: Differing Judicial Interpretations
of a Familiar Term, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 615 (2006); Goldberg, supra note 111; Farns-
worth, supra note 111.
150. The court states that: "Essential to the enforcement of a 'best efforts'
clause is a clear set of guidelines against which the parties' 'best efforts' may be
measured." Pinnacle Books, 519 F. Supp. at 121.
151. Id. at 120.
152. It should be noted that there exists a minority of states where the lan-
guage of best efforts is considered too vague to satisfy the definiteness of terms
requirement. See, e.g., Krafco Corp. v. Kolbus, 274 N.E.2d 153 (Iln. App. Ct. 1971)
(involving the holding of an express best efforts provision as illusory). See also
James M. Van Vilet, Jr., "Best Efforts" Promises Under Illinois Law, 88 ILL. B.J.
698 (2000). Professor Mooney notes the weakening of the conceptual obstacles to
the finding of the true intent of the parties and the meaning of their contracts: "In
the modern era ... many commentators and courts substantially lowered the con-
ceptualist barriers to implication. An early and renowned landmark on this partic-
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evidence allowed for the finding of contracts of various types
where previously none were found. Contextual evidence was
used by Cardozo to salvage numerous varieties of contracts. 15 3
As a result, the incompleteness of most agreements became
openly recognized.
Cardozo was not the creator of this method of contract in-
terpretation, but he was one of its most articulate proponents.
Cardozo's quotation of the English case of The Moorcock 54 is
especially telling. He approves of Lord Bowen's "business effi-
cacy" approach to contract interpretation. 155 Bowen argued that
if there is a presumption of intent to enter into a contract, then
"a failure of consideration. . . cannot have been within the con-
templation of the parties." 56 It is the job of the law through
implication of terms to "give such business efficacy to the trans-
action as must have been intended." 57 This willingness to im-
ply meaning into contracts through use of extrinsic evidence
was made necessary by an industrial-national economy. The
growth of a modern marketplace resulted in "new contracting
practices, characterized by reduced specificity in the terms of
agreement." 58 Cardozo and Lord Bowen understood that con-
tract law and contract interpretation needed to evolve to be-
come more functional.
It is difficult to disregard the importance of Cardozo as the
opinion's author in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. 59 The importance
ular road to modernism was Justice Cardozo's opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon." Ralph J. Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131, 1171 (1995).
153. Llewellyn describes Cardozo's approach to contract interpretation as a
three-fold exercise. First, to determine if there is a general intent of having en-
tered into a contract. Second, avoid the "manipulation" of the mutuality require-
ment. Third, assume that the parties intended a balanced contract and read that
balance into the contract. LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 368.
154. The Moorcock, (1889) 14 P.D. 64 (Eng.).
155. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
156. Moorcock, 14 P.D. at 68.
157. Id.
158. Pratt, supra note 3, at 417-18. Professor Pratt notes that there was a
general trend in the use of "open contracts" during this period. "The agreement
between Wood and Lucy typified the responses to uncertainty about the markets.
Like Lucy and Wood, many parties were unable to define the future with precision.
They therefore preferred to leave parts of any agreement 'open' to await future
developments." Id. at 434.
159. Cardozo was a truly gifted writer: "[Blecause his words, phrases, use of
language and parallels from other disciplines are sufficiently extensive and too
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of Cardozo's rhetorical gifts are universally recognized. What
the Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon opinion lacked in originality was
compensated for by the power of its rhetoric. 160 It is the rhetoric
of many of Cardozo's opinions that explains some of their last-
ing impact on modern contract law. Language such as "instinct
with obligation imperfectly expressed" and "law has grown from
its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman" achieved a level of "omnisignificance" 16'
that explain their continued relevance. The power of the rheto-
ric results not just in the rhetorical flare of the language but
also the ability of the language to remain accessible to future
judges and scholars. 62 It is Cardozo's language and reputation
that at least partially explains the lifespan of Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon.
Cardozo's differentiation of categories of transaction-types
helped release judicial interpretation of contracts from the re-
straints of legal formalism-as represented by the four-corners
and plain meaning rules. The benefits of such a contextual
analysis include the interpretation of contracts more aligned to
the true intent of the parties and the lowering of transaction
costs relating to the negotiation and drafting of contracts.
The cost of the contextual mode of interpretation is what
was previously described as the definitional problem. How does
one determine material from trivial breach? Once an implied
duty of reasonable efforts is implied what is the threshold for
satisfying such a standard? If an agreement possesses an "in-
stinct with an obligation," then how does a court follow that in-
exquisite." Joseph W. Bellacosa, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo the Teacher, 16 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2415, 2429 (1995).
160. Professor Hillman notes the impact of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon in the law
of incomplete contracts: "Many of the contract-law cases reflected the approach
Cardozo had in mind when he adopted the instinct language in Wood v. Lucy: fo-
cusing on the context to determine the parties' intentions about an incomplete con-
tract." Robert A. Hillman, 'Instinct with an Obligation' and the 'Normative
Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power,' 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 775, 790 (1995).
161. Professor Lake defines omnisignificance as "a special characteristic of
persistent rhetoric that takes the form of, or is akin to, literature." Peter F. Lake,
Posner's Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545 (1994).
162. Opinions that "have a considerable generality, ambiguity or adaptability
[have] an 'omnisignificance' that enables them to survive vicissitudes of culture
and taste." Id. at 605 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 394 (1990)).
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stinct to find and define an obligation? Cardozo provided an
answer of sorts. The answer lies in a contextual analysis of the
parties, the transaction-type and the practices and usages of the
particular trade. 163
V. Conclusion
Cardozo's efforts to give economic functionality to new and
evolving transaction-types lead to a diminishment of the formal
requirements of contract law. This diminishment allowed for
the enlistment of contextual evidence to fill in the gaps of in-
complete contracts. In the end, Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon repre-
sents the contextual view that contracts are to be interpreted
from the perspective of practical, sophisticated businessper-
sons. 64 In doing so, it helped change the way judges look at
how the law relates to disputes and their contexts.
The importance of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to the American
contract canon is best understood as it being one of a series of
opinions, given by one of America's greatest and most articulate
judicial innovators, to reform contract law in response to the
novelties of turn of the century contract practices. In the end,
the brevity of the analysis, the existence of a general trend to-
ward contextualism and the associated judicial activism in im-
plying terms makes this Cardozo opinion not one that goes "a
step beyond."165 That said, Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon's position
in contract law jurisprudence remains secure due to the unique-
ness of the parties involved-Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon and Ben-
jamin Nathan Cardozo.
163. Professor Hillman states the "forced" shift to contextualism as follows: "I
conclude that instinct rhetoric has contributed to clearer decisions because the lan-
guage succinctly captures and conveys the idea that courts should engage in a deep
contextual analysis in deciding contract cases." Hillman, supra note 160, at 779.
164. See Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins., 86 N.W. 344, 345 (Minn. 1901) (in
upholding the enforceability of output-requirements contracts the court states that
interpretations of contracts be done "from the standpoint of the practical business
men who made it").
165. The Moorcock, (1889) 14 P.D. 64, 68 (Eng.).
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